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 For many people, passing their worldly possessions and wealth down to their 
children is of great importance. While some choose to give their wealth away as gifts 
during their lifetimes, others choose to wait and have their wealth transferred at 
death. Changes in a testator’s known family structure subsequent to the creation of 
her will can result in a will that no longer comports with the testator’s final intentions. 
One event that potentially affects the distribution of assets under a will is the 
unforeseen birth of a child after the will is executed—so-called after-born children. 
Recognizing the complication posed by after-born children, the New York Legislature 
attempted to provide for such children in New York’s Estates, Powers and Trusts 
Law (EPTL) section 5-3.2. This statute, known as the after-born statute, allows the 
courts to provide for an after-born child (or children) of the deceased and avoid 
seemingly inadvertent disinheritances.1
 At first glance, the meaning of after-born children appears quite simple: the 
children born after the execution of a will. However, this concept quickly becomes 
more complicated2 considering that the term after-born children encompasses 
multiple categories, including: children born following the execution of the parent’s 
will but during the parent’s lifetime (the most basic type of after-born child),3 
children born following the execution of the parent’s will but after the parent’s death 
(sometimes called posthumous children),4 and non-biological children who were 
1. See In re Estate of Wilkins, 691 N.Y.S.2d 878, 881 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1999) (observing that EPTL 
5-3.2 effectively nullifies the will “to the extent required to give the child his intestate share”); see also In 
re Gilmore, 925 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568 (2d Dep’t 2011) (“[T]o address situations where a child is 
inadvertently left out of a parent’s will because such child was born after the will ’s execution, the 
Legislature enacted EPTL 5-3.2.”).
2. “A legitimate natural child is a ‘child’ for inheritance purposes. Beyond that, it gets complicated.” Sol 
Lovas, When Is a Family Not a Family? Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheritance Within the Non-
Traditional Family, 24 Idaho L. Rev. 353, 367 (1987–1988).
3. N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 5-3.2(a) (McKinney 2011) (“Whenever a testator has a child born 
after the execution of a last will . . . every such child shall succeed to a portion of the testator’s estate . . . .”).
4. Id. § 5-3.2(b) (“The term ‘after-born child’ shall mean a child of the testator . . . in gestation at the time 
of the testator’s death and born thereafter.”). With respect to children born following the execution of 
the parent’s will and after the parent’s death, the distinction between posthumous children and 
posthumously conceived children is important because posthumous children qualify for a portion of 
their parent’s estate under EPTL 5-3.2, while posthumously conceived children do not qualify. The 
determining factor is the state of the biological parents at the time of conception. If both parents are 
alive when the child is conceived, but one or more is deceased at the time of birth, the child is said to be 
a posthumous child. If one or both of the biological parents are deceased at the time of conception, the 
child is called posthumously conceived. Posthumously conceived children are possible only through 
scientific advances that allow a person’s frozen gametes (eggs or sperm) to remain viable after the person 
is deceased. Thus, if a person (man or woman) has their deceased partner’s gametes frozen, that person 
could still produce children with the deceased partner as if the partner were still alive.
New York’s EPTL 5-3.2(b) specifically includes posthumous children (both parents alive at 
conception) in the definition of after-born child, giving posthumous children relief under the statute. 
See id. However, posthumously conceived children are specifically barred from receiving a portion of 
their parent’s estate through EPTL 5-3.2 by the same section of the statute because they were not “in 
gestation at the time of the testator’s death.” Id. Posthumously conceived children (one parent deceased 
at conception) will be considered in more detail below at text accompanying notes 78 to 82, but will not 
be the focus of this comment. For a recent scholarly article that considers the complicated legal rights of 
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adopted following the execution of the will, whether born before or after that 
execution (commonly known as the adoption exception).5 More simply stated, so 
long as the after-born child is conceived during the testator’s lifetime, the child need 
only be born or adopted after the will is executed to qualify as an after-born child. 
Interestingly, New York common law considers adopted children as born on the date 
of adoption.6 As such, the adopted child need only be adopted after the testator 
executes her will, regardless the child’s date of birth, in order to qualify under EPTL 
5-3.2.
 In In re Gilmore, the New York State Appellate Division, Second Department, 
considered a very complex after-born child issue: whether a testator’s biological 
children, who were born before the execution of a will, whose existence was unknown 
to the testator at the time of the will’s execution, and who became known to the 
testator prior to his death, can qualify as after-born children within the meaning of 
EPTL 5-3.2.7 Allowing these children to qualify would require courts to recognize 
a new common law exception to EPTL 5-3.2 for after-known8 children—that is, 
biological children whose existence the testator realized only after the execution of 
her will. Arguably, after-known children are comparable to the existing common law 
adoption exception, which permits children adopted by the testator after the 
execution of her will to qualify as after-born children even if the child was born 
before the execution of the will.9 However, despite the similarities between adopted 
children and after-known children, the Second Department in Gilmore refused to 
recognize after-known children within the meaning of EPTL 5-3.2.10
 This case comment argues that the Second Department incorrectly grounded its 
ruling in a plain meaning interpretation of EPTL 5-3.2 when it should have premised 
its holding on an analysis of Gilmore’s intent. The Second Department’s plain 
meaning interpretation of EPTL 5-3.2 deprives the lower courts of the f lexibility to 
equitably distribute a parent’s assets to her children in a manner that is most in 
harmony with the overall intent of the testator. While the early statutory and 
posthumously conceived children, see Morgan Kirkland Wood, It Takes a Village: Considering the Other 
Interests at Stake When Extending Inheritance Rights to Posthumously Conceived Children, 44 Ga. L. Rev. 
873 (2010).
5. See, e.g., Bourne v. Dorney, 171 N.Y.S. 264, 269 (2d Dep’t 1918), aff ’d, 227 N.Y. 641 (1919).
6. See In re Gilmore, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 571 (2d Dep’t 2011) (citing Est. Powers & Trusts § 5-3.2 cmt. 
(Adopted and Non-Marital Children)).
7. Id.
8. The term after-known children appears to have been coined in the In re Gilmore case by Andrea Hofler’s 
attorney, Oshrie Zak, in his efforts to equate Andrea and Malverick Hofler with after-born children 
under EPTL 5-3.2. For an early example of Mr. Zak’s use of the term after-known see Brief for 
Appellant at 2, In re Gilmore 925 N.Y.S.2d 567 (2d Dep’t 2011) (No. 346747) (on file with author 
courtesy of Oshrie Zak, Attorney for Appellant).
9. The court in Bourne v. Dorney created the adoption exception for adopted children, finding that, by 
virtue of being adopted after the execution of the will, these children were thus essentially “born” after 
the execution of the will. See Bourne, 171 N.Y.S. at 269.
10. In re Gilmore, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 571. 
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common law origins of EPTL 5-3.2 demonstrate that it is designed to avoid 
inadvertent or accidental disinheritances of children,11 another important purpose of 
the statute is to achieve an equitable distribution of a parent’s estate that is consistent 
with the parent’s presumed intent.12 Thus, rather than imposing a strict rule excluding 
all after-known children from the protection of EPTL 5-3.2, the solution should be 
to give the courts a framework with enough flexibility to carry out the intent of the 
testator. By permitting the courts to either include or exclude after-known children 
from inheriting a portion of the parent’s estate based on the particular circumstances 
of each case, such a framework would more effectively allow the testator’s intent to 
remain the focus of asset distribution under the will.13
 This case comment will first introduce the factual and procedural history that 
led to the Second Department’s decision in In re Gilmore. It will then proceed by 
examining the legislative history and judicial precedent behind EPTL 5-3.2, 
demonstrating how nineteenth-century interpretations of the after-born statute have 
focused primarily on preserving the intent of the testator. The third section of this 
comment will demonstrate how early twentieth-century cases, while straying from 
the conclusions reached in nineteenth-century cases, nevertheless consistently 
retained the testator’s intent as the primary focus of the analysis. The fourth section 
will explore how a series of amendments to the statute, beginning in 1966, aimed at 
ensuring that a will comports with the final wishes of the testator. Finally, this 
comment will show how the Second Department’s recent decision in In re Gilmore 
departed dramatically from the historical purpose of the statute by imposing a strict 
rule that disregards testator intent.
 On June 24, 1996, Roy L. Gilmore, Sr. executed his last will and testament.14 At 
five pages in length, the will was neither very long nor overly complicated. In the will, 
Gilmore gave his entire estate, including his interest in the Roy L. Gilmore Funeral 
Home and substantial real property in New York, South Carolina, and the Virgin 
Islands, to his daughter Angela Manning.15 In the event that Manning predeceased 
11. See In re Estate of Faber, 305 N.Y. 200, 203 (1953) (explaining that the after-born statute’s purpose was 
“to guard against inadvertent or unintentional disinheritance” (citing Wormser v. Croce, 104 N.Y.S. 
1090, 1091 (1907))).
12. 1966 N.Y. Laws 2907 (stating that revisions to the after-born statute were made in an attempt to align 
the statute with “the reasonably presumable intention of the normal parent”).
13. In a response to the increasingly complicated nature of American families, Susan Gary, in her article 
Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, advocates for a similar overhaul of the entire intestacy 
statute, but notes that the probate court should not be given complete discretion over intestate shares, 
because such discretion “will almost certainly yield uneven results.” Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy 
Laws to Changing Families, 18 Law & Ineq. 1, 71–72 (2000).
14. Affidavit of Comparison at 1, In re Gilmore, No. 3467217 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Cnty. Apr. 16, 2007) (on file 
with author).
15. Id. at 2–3. At the time of his death, Roy Gilmore’s cumulative estate was valued at approximately $5 
million, and Gilmore had a total of eleven children: three were with his first wife, four were with his 
second wife, and four were alleged non-marital children, two of which were Andrea and Malverick 
Hofler. See In re Gilmore, No. 346747, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6618, at *1 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Cnty. Dec. 
23, 2009).
641
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 57 | 2012/13
him, Gilmore’s will provided that another daughter, Alicia Gilmore, would inherit his 
estate.16 Otherwise, the rest of Gilmore’s surviving children were left unmentioned, 
although not specifically written out of the will.17 Ten years later, in early 2006, 
Gilmore learned that he had two more biological children—Andrea Hofler and 
Malverick Hofler—whom Gilmore later confirmed were his biological children 
through DNA testing.18 Gilmore appears not to have challenged the DNA results, 
and he even began to introduce the Hoflers to other family members as his children.19
 Gilmore died on January 13, 2007, approximately one year after first meeting 
Andrea and Malverick Hofler and acknowledging them as his biological children.20 
This timeline suggests that Gilmore would have had time to amend his will to 
include the Hoflers, should he have wanted to do so. In the will offered for probate, 
however, the Hoflers, along with eight of Gilmore’s other nine children, did not 
receive any portion of Gilmore’s estate.21 Instead, Gilmore left his millions to Angela 
Manning, the named executrix of his estate and a daughter from his first marriage.22
 Over a year after the will was offered for probate, Andrea and Malverick Hofler 
both moved for summary judgment requesting that the court treat them as Gilmore’s 
after-born children pursuant to New York’s after-born statute, EPTL 5-3.2. The 
argument advanced by the Hoflers was that “non-marital children, only known or 
acknowledged by their father after execution of his will, should be accorded the same 
presumption of inadvertent disinheritance as an after-born child and extended the 
same rights.”23
 The Surrogate’s Court denied the Hoflers’ motion in a December 23, 2009 
opinion, stating that because the Hoflers are not, strictly speaking, “child[ren] born 
after the execution of a last will . . . . [Andrea and Malverick Hofler] are not entitled 
to any rights under the after-born statute (EPTL 5-3.2).”24 The court further noted 
that it “is not at liberty to conjecture about, add to or subtract from words having a 
definite and plain meaning.”25 Over a year after their motion was denied, the Hoflers 
were granted a motion to reargue by the Surrogate’s Court; however, the reargument 
16. Affidavit of Comparison, supra note 14, at 3–4.
17. See id. at 3 (noting only that Gilmore’s wife, Carol V. Gilmore, was expressly excluded from any 
inheritance).
18. In re Gilmore, 925 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568 (2d Dep’t 2011). Malverick Hofler was born November 1, 1963 
and Andrea Hofler was born on September 19, 1965. Brief for Appellant, supra note 8, at 2. 
19. In re Gilmore, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
20. Id. at 568. 
21. In re Gilmore, No. 346747, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6618, at *1 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Cnty. Dec. 23, 2009).
22. Id. 
23. Id. at *2.
24. Id. at *3.
25. Id.
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merited the same disposition.26 After losing the reargument, the Hoflers filed an 
appeal with the Second Department.
 In a unanimous decision, the Second Department affirmed the ruling of the 
Surrogate’s Court and denied the Hof lers’ request to be treated as after-born 
children.27 The decision of the Second Department followed the reasoning in the 
Surrogate Court’s decision, but considered the issues in more detail, specifically 
analyzing the facts of this case under the adoption exception.28 The adoption 
exception is a common law doctrine that allows children born before the execution of 
a will to be recognized as after-born children.29 The doctrine does this by interpreting 
“birth” in the case of an adopted child to be the date of the child’s adoption.30 
Realizing the implications of the doctrine, the Second Department acknowledged 
the “somewhat sympathetic” position in which the adoption exception placed the 
Hoflers. That is, had the Hoflers been adopted by instead of reunited with their 
father, they would have likely won their case.31
 The problem Gilmore poses is that it sets precedent favoring the plain meaning of 
EPTL 5-3.2 that excludes all after-known biological children from being able to 
contest a parent’s will regardless of the individual circumstances. This approach 
ignores the development of the statute and its common law history, both of which 
give deference to the intent of the testator. Because lower courts are obliged to follow 
the precedent set by Gilmore, they may be unable to achieve the overall purpose of 
EPTL 5-3.2 and avoid accidental disinheritances in the event that a testator is 
unaware of one or more of his children at the time he executes his will.32 Rather, the 
court should have adopted a more nuanced approach through an analysis of Gilmore’s 
intent by taking into consideration such factors as his knowledge of the existence of 
his children and the desire to gift money to existing children. This more nuanced 
approach would be more in line with the purpose of the after-born statute because it 
would be more likely to give appropriate deference to the intent of the testator.
 Although the court in Gilmore considered the legislative intent behind EPTL 
5-3.2, this case comment finds that the history accompanying the statute does not 
26. The decision of the Second Department on June 14, 2011 makes no mention of the reargument granted 
January 21, 2011, see In re Gilmore, No. 346747 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Cnty. Jan. 21, 2011) (order granting 
motion to reargue), but rather notes that the current appeal was the result of an appeal from the probate 
proceeding dated December 23, 2009. See In re Gilmore, 925 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568 (2d Dep’t 2011).
27. See id. According to Andrea Hofler’s attorney, Oshrie Zak, Mr. Zak tried the Gilmore case pro bono. 
E-mail from Oshrie Zak, Attorney for Andrea Hofler, to author (Sept. 30, 2011, 16:47 EST) (on file 
with author).
28. In re Gilmore, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 570–71 (citing Bourne v. Dorney, 171 N.Y.S. 264, 264 (2d Dep’t 1918), 
aff ’d, 227 N.Y. 641 (1919)).
29. Id. at 571 (citing N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 5-3.2 cmt. (McKinney 2011) (Adopted and Non-
Marital Children)).
30. Id.
31. See id. at 574.
32. See infra note 96 for a discussion on the increasing likelihood of cases in which a testator may be 
unaware of the existence of all of his children. 
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support the court’s holding. More specifically, the statutory history focuses on the 
intent of the testator, which was rejected by the court in Gilmore in favor of a plain 
meaning interpretation. As such, this case comment will first review the history of 
the statute, including amendments and key interpretive cases that have shaped the 
statute into its present form.
 The oldest statutory version of EPTL 5-3.2 dates back to New York’s Revised 
Statutes published in 1829.33 This version of the statute provided the basic framework. 
An after-born child was “a child born after the making of [the testator’s] will, in his 
life-time or after his death.” 34 To qualify for protection under the statute, the child had 
to also be “unprovided for by any settlement . . . [and not] in any way mentioned in his 
will.”35 In the event that the child did qualify under the statute, the after-born child 
would receive the same portion of the father’s estate as “if the father had died intestate.”36
 Initially, the courts adopted a very narrow interpretation of the statute’s definition 
of “child.” In two notable cases, the term “child” was first limited to a biological 
33. The court in Gilmore relies on the opinion In re Estate of Faber, 305 N.Y. 200 (1953), for the legislative 
history of EPTL 5-3.2. In re Gilmore, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 572–73. The Faber opinion contends that the 
earliest version of EPTL 5-3.2 was enacted in 1830. In re Estate of Faber, 305 N.Y. at 203 (referring to the 
then-present location of New York’s after-born statute, Decedent Estate Law § 26). However, the earliest 
form of the after-born statute in New York was likely enacted some time before the 1827 and 1828 
legislative session, and was subsequently published in 1829. See N.Y. Rev. Stat. ch. VI, art. 3, § 49 (1829).
Because the 1829 after-born statute appears codified as a statute and not as part of an act or bill in 
this publication, the statute may actually pre-date the 1827 and 1828 legislative sessions. However, the 
exact year in which the original after-born statute was enacted remains unknown. One clue is that the 
Laws of the State of New York, 1802 contain a complete statute concerning wills that does not include 
an after-born statute. This seems to imply that the New York state legislature enacted the after-born 
statute sometime after 1802 but before 1827–1828. See An Act to Reduce the Laws concerning Wills 
into one Statute, 1 N.Y. Laws 178 (1802).
Allowing an exception for after-born children was likely not first conceptualized by New York 
State’s legislators. Instead, the court in In re Will of Ashby notes that New York’s after-born statute is 
“derived from the civil law under which a will was revoked by the birth of offspring.” 524 N.Y.S.2d 652, 
653 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 1988) (citing Delafield v. Parish, 25 N.Y. 9 (1862)); 1 Thomas Jarman, A 
Treatise on Wills ch. VII, § 1 (Joseph F. Randolph & William Talcott eds., Frederick D. Linn & 
Co. 5th Am. Ed. 1880). Delafield does not appear to support the court’s assertions. The only reference 
in Delafield to the civil law has no application to after-born children; rather, the opinion notes that the 
civil law rendered void a will “if a party writes or prepares a will under which he takes a benefit.” 
Delafield v. Parish, 25 N.Y. 9, 36 (1862).
Jarman on Wills supports the court’s assertion in In re Will of Ashby regarding the origin of the 
after-born statute and points to the likely source of New York’s after-born statute, an old English case, 
Overbury v. Overbury, 2 Show. 242 (1682). Overbury, decided before the English court, held that 
children born after the execution of a will may revoke the will. See John Chipman Gray, Select 
Cases and Other Authorities on the Law of Property 389 (Charles W. Sever & Co. 1890). 
Later, the after-born rule was adopted by the common law courts in Christopher v. Christopher, 4 Burr. 
2171 (1771). See Arthur W. Blakemore, Law of Wills Executors and Administrators (1923), 
at 736 n.7. Thus, it is likely that the after-born rule was imported into New York’s courts as a result of 
common law roots with England.
34. N.Y. Rev. Stat. ch. VI, art. 3, § 49 (1829).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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child of the testator37 and then further limited to a legitimate, biological child of the 
testator.38 Under an interpretation of the word child that only includes legitimate, 
biological children, the extramarital Hofler children in Gilmore would not qualify as 
after-born even if they were in fact born after their father executed his will. But this 
is by no means inconsistent with the argument that the statute has historically been 
interpreted to give deference to the intent of the testator. Rather, these early 
interpretations of the statute reflect a time when non-marital and adopted children 
were not legally or socially considered the equals of marital children.39 As such, these 
early courts excluded non-biological and non-marital children precisely because the 
courts meant to give deference to the intent of the testator, since it would have been 
most common for the testator at this time to intentionally omit such children.40
 This narrow definition of “children” under the after-born statute prevailed 
through the end of the nineteenth century. While the statute itself was not substantially 
revised until 1966,41 two notable cases from the early twentieth century signal a 
changing trend in society’s view of “children.” The first case, McLean v. McLean, 
provides insight into the court’s still-current understanding of the statute.42 The 
37. See Barnes v. Greenzebach, 1 Edw. Ch. 41, 43–44 (1831) (“[A]s a general rule, persons standing in that 
relative position, and who have only acquired the title of son or daughter, child or grand-child, by or in 
consequence or marriage, are excluded from the class of persons who are to take by the general 
description of children or grand-children.”).
38. See Cromer v. Pinckney, 3 Barb. Ch. 466, 466 (1848) (explaining that the ordinary meaning of the word 
“children” was limited to “immediate legitimate descendants”). The precedent set in Cromer would not 
be overturned until In re Estate of Wilkins, 691 N.Y.S.2d 878 (Sur. Ct. New York Cnty. 1999).
39. Regarding non-marital children, Jesse Dukeminier wrote that “[a]lthough innocent of any sin or crime, 
children of unmarried parents were given harsh, pitiless treatment by the common law. A child born 
out-of-wedlock was filius nullius, the child of no one.” Jesse Dukeminier et al., Wills, Trusts, and 
Estates 100 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 7th ed. 2005) (citation omitted). Both the Barnes and 
Cromer courts seem to have held the intent of the testator in high regard.
40. See Barnes, 1 Edw. Ch. at 44. (“[A] clear or manifest intention to the contrary expressed in the will . . . 
will govern and control the legal operation of words.”); see Cromer, 3 Barb. Ch. at 466 (reasoning that 
the term “children” “will not include illegitimate offspring, stepchildren, children by marriage only, 
grand-children, or more remote descendants” unless there is something “to show that the testator 
intended to use it in a different sense”).
41. The 1859 version of the after-born statute is word-for-word the same as the 1829 version, except that 
most of the commas were removed. See 1 N.Y. Laws 40 (1869). Interestingly, the 1869 amendment to 
the statute only changed the after-born statute to be gender neutral, possibly ref lecting changes in the 
law that first afforded married women their property rights and the right to dispose of that property in 
a will. See Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law: Women, Marriage, and Property in 
Nineteenth-Century New York 162–99 (1982), for an interesting discussion of the Earnings Act of 
1860, which granted women “sole and separate property” rights from their husbands. Id. at 234. The 
first substantial revision to the statute would come in 1966. See infra pp. 647–48.
42. McLean v. McLean, 207 N.Y. 365 (1913). McLean is given credit as “authority” in the most updated 
edition of New York Jurisprudence for the “fundamental object” or the “legislative intent” of the 
statute. See 38 N.Y. Jur. 2d Decedents’ Estates § 124 (2012).
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second case, Bourne v. Dorney,43 expanded the scope of “children” under the statute to 
include adopted children.
 McLean was the first New York Court of Appeals case of the twentieth century 
to conduct an in-depth consideration of the legislative intent behind the after-born 
statute.44 The McLean court recognized that the after-born statute created an internal 
tension within intestacy law;45 namely, on one hand, the law does not compel parents 
to bequeath anything to their children at death,46 while on the other, a sense of 
justice—and, the court is quick to mention, a statute—enables the law to provide for 
after-born children outside of the will.47 To resolve this apparent tension, the court 
turned to the legislative intent behind the after-born statute.48
 According to the McLean court, the legislature created the statute to guard 
against a testator’s “thoughtlessness and lack of vision,” which could “prevent a 
testator from contemplating the possibility of after-born children.”49 The court 
concluded that if the testator “overlook[s] and fail[s] to consider the possibility and 
claims of those who, if born, will be the natural objects of his bounty, the law will 
provide for them.”50 Thus, the court understood the after-born statute to be a 
legislated safeguard against testators who inadvertently fail to include their after-
born children in their will due to lack of foresight. This view of the statute resolves 
the internal tension in the law by emphasizing the intent of the testator. That is, the 
court in McLean is making it clear that the law is not necessarily compelling these 
testators to provide for their children, so much as the law is allowing intent to include 
43. Bourne v. Dorney, 171 N.Y.S. 264, 264 (2d Dep’t 1918), aff ’d, 227 N.Y. 641 (1919). Because the New 
York Court of Appeals affirmed the Second Department’s decision without writing its own opinion, the 
discussion of Bourne is based on the decision of the Second Department.
44. A WestlawNextTM search of New York Court of Appeals cases discussing the after-born statute between 
the years of 1899 and 1914 yielded only five results, including McLean. Of the four results not including 
McLean—In re U.S. Trust Co. of New York, 175 N.Y. 304 (1903); Pimel v. Betjemann, 183 N.Y. 194 
(1905); In re Lansing’s Estate, 182 N.Y. 238 (1905); Cammann v. Bailey, 210 N.Y. 19 (1913)—none 
undertook a discussion of the legislative intent behind the after-born statute.
45. See McLean, 207 N.Y. at 371–72.
46. Id. at 371 (“[I]t has never been held or assumed, in this state at least, that it was the intention of the 
Legislature by this statute to compel, regulate, or control testamentary provision even by a parent for 
children.”).
47. Id. (“For reasons which at once commend themselves to our sense of justice it has been determined, and 
by statute provided, that if a testator does thus overlook and fail to consider the possibility and claims of 
those who, if born, will be the natural objects of his bounty, the law will provide for them in the 
distribution of his estate outside of the terms of his will”).
48. See id. The McLean court does not use the phrase “legislative intent,” but appears to use the term 
“fundamental object” as a synonym for the phrase.
49. Id.
50. Id. In McLean, the court would most likely not have considered the possibility that the testator may 
already have children of which he was not aware because illegitimate children had been specifically 
barred from recovery under the after-born statute since the Cromer case in 1848 and presumably the 
testator is aware of his legitimate children at the time he executes his will. Cf. Cromer v. Pinckney, 3 
Barb. Ch. 466, 466 (1848) (defining children as “immediate legitimate descendants”).
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after-born children in a will to be implied where neither the will, nor any extraneous 
settlements, suggests that this assumption is contrary to the testator’s wishes. This 
reasoning should also lead courts to the conclusion that, in some instances, the plight 
of an after-known child is substantially the same as an after-born child, especially 
because both involve a certain “thoughtlessness and lack of vision” of the “natural 
objects” of one’s bounty.
 Only five years after McLean, Bourne v. Dorney greatly expanded the scope of 
children protected by the after-born statute when, for the first time, the courts in 
New York recognized that a child adopted after the execution of the will is “a child 
born after the making of a last will.”51 As such, an “after-adopted” child is entitled to 
the same protection under the after-born statute as a biological child.52 This 
expansion in the statute was not unanimously approved. In a dissenting opinion, 
Judge Putnam argued for a plain reading of the statute, noting that allowing adopted 
children to qualify as after-born children construed the after-born statute to read 
“shall have a child born [or adopted] after the making of his will.”53 The dissent 
reasoned that this could not possibly have been the purpose of the legislature since 
legal adoption did not exist in New York when the then-current after-born statute 
was enacted.54 Judge Thomas, writing for the majority, rebuffed the dissent’s concern, 
finding that “it is not necessary to interpolate words into the statute, but rather to 
decide that [the recently amended sections 100 and 114 of the N.Y. Domestic 
Relations Law] caused the adopted child to be regarded as the equivalent in right of 
the natural child.”55 With this reasoning, the Second Department in Bourne reversed 
the decision of the lower court and held that after-adopted children qualified as 
children under the after-born statute.56 On appeal, the Court of Appeals unanimously 
affirmed the decision of the Second Department.57
 Including adopted children within the after-born statute was a significant step in 
expanding the scope of the after-born statute. Even further, Bourne ref lects an 
important divergence from the prevailing trend of adherence to the plain meaning of 
the statute when faced with changed societal circumstances. Instead, Bourne 
51. Bourne v. Dorney, 171 N.Y.S. 264, 264 (2d Dep’t 1918), aff ’d, 227 N.Y. 641 (1919) (quoting EPTL 
5-3.2’s forerunner, N.Y. Decedent Est. Law § 26). 
52. The court in Bourne did not use the term “after-adopted.”
53. Id. at 272.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 270. Section 114 of the Domestic Relations Law (DRL) governs the rights granted to a legally 
adopted child. Section 114 of the DRL was amended in 1887 to include the right of inheritance for 
adopted children, while it had earlier specifically excluded the right. Id. at 266. In 1896, section 100 of 
the DRL (at the time of Bourne, section 110 of the DRL) established June 25, 1873 as the cut-off date, 
before which an adoption had no effect on an adoptive parent’s will, devise, or trust. Id. 
56. Id. at 271. 
57. Bourne v. Dorney, 227 N.Y. 641 (1919).
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emphasized the focus on the testator’s intent by adopting a legal fiction,58 the adoption 
exception,59 that would unite the intent of the legislature with the intent of the 
testator.60 This legal fiction allowed the adopted child in Bourne to inherit from her 
adoptive father exactly as if she had been born to him as a biological child.
 Thus, even though the court in Gilmore noted that the reason it rejected an after-
known child exception was because it would be “contrary to the plain meaning” of 
EPTL 5-3.2, this reason blatantly contradicts the rationale for including adopted 
children in Bourne, which has never been overruled. In Gilmore, the court states that:
[i]f the movants’ arguments were to be accepted, the result would be that 
children born of a testator prior to the execution of a will, but unknown to such 
testator, could be entitled to be treated as an after-born child. This would 
lead to a result that would be contrary to the plain meaning of EPTL 5-3.2.61
 However, by enforcing the adoption exception, Bourne found that the plain 
meaning of EPTL 5-3.2 is subordinate to the intent of the testator. As such, an 
exception for after-known children, while contrary to the plain meaning of EPTL 
5-3.2, would not be unique and would not necessarily be contrary to the overall 
purpose of the statute, which is to avoid the inadvertent or accidental disinheritance 
of children.62
 Following Bourne, the next major change in New York’s after-born statute 
occurred in 1966, when the statute was moved from section 26 of the Decedent Estate 
Law (DEL) to its current location in EPTL 5-3.2.63 For the after-born statute, the 
relocation was not only a simple reorganization, but also a revision. The Revisers’ 
Notes comment that the revision was intended to “eliminate a serious defect in the 
policy underpinning of [the after-born] statue [sic],” while leaving the principle 
58. Nancy J. Knauer defined a legal fiction as “a device used to facilitate the application of the law to novel 
legal questions and circumstances.” Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truths, 23 St. Thomas 
L. Rev. 1, 9 (2010) (citing Lon L. Fuller, Legal Fictions 1, 21–22 (1967)). Knauer notes that while 
some legal fictions are “bald untruths,” others “operate more in the realm of metaphor.” Id. The adoption 
exception would seem to fit into the latter category of metaphor since the exception treats the adopted 
child as if she were born after the execution of a will even though she was in fact born before.
59. See In re Gilmore, 925 N.Y.S.2d 567, 571 (2d Dep’t 2011) (“As a result of the decision in Bourne, children 
adopted in [New York] are considered born to a testator at the time of the adoption for the purposes of 
EPTL 5-3.2” (citing N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 5-3.2 cmt. (McKinney 2011) (Adopted and 
Non-Marital Children))).
60. See Bourne v. Dorney, 171 N.Y.S. 264, 267 (2d Dep’t 1918), aff ’d, 227 N.Y. 641 (1919) (“But if the 
statutes, read together, be construed to mean that the adopted child shall have the entire status of the 
born child, and that his exclusion from a will was not intentional, because his existence and relation to 
the testator were unseen and unknowable, then not only is the foster parent’s power to disinherit 
preserved, but also the duties and rights that the statute imposes and confers are fulfilled.”).
61. In re Gilmore, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 572 (emphasis added).
62. See In re Estate of Faber, 305 N.Y. 200, 203 (1953) (“[The after-born statute’s] purpose was . . . to guard 
against inadvertent or unintentional disinheritance.” (citing Wormser v. Croce, 120 App. Div. 287, 289 
(1st Dep’t 1907) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
63. See 1966 N.Y. Laws 2907–08. The relocation of DEL § 26 to EPTL 5-3.2 was part of a much larger 
effort to reorganize New York’s laws in 1966. See id.
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underlying the after-born statute unaffected.64 Under the old statute, if a parent 
excluded her children from inheritance in her will, but made no reference to how 
after-born children should be treated, then after-born children would still be allowed 
to take an intestate share of their parent’s estate.65 The revision changes this outcome, 
interpreting the parent’s decision to exclude some children from the will as the intent 
to limit the inheritance of all future children. By adjusting the statute to account for 
this unique circumstance, the revision and accompanying comments ref lect the 
purpose and general trend in the statute to give deference to the intent of the testator. 
Similarly, this case comment’s proposed solution to Gilmore promotes deference to the 
intent of the testator through f lexibility that allows after-known children to be 
included in the after-born statute, with the requirement that some threshold amount 
of evidence be provided by the party claiming protection that would show that their 
inclusion would not be contrary to the intent of the testator.
 Going back to the 1966 amendment, the legislature certainly acted wisely to bring 
the after-born statute more in line with the intent of the average parent. Unfortunately, 
the legislature’s solution was to replace the previous rigid rule that all after-born 
children would be entitled to inheritance with a new rigid rule that granted after-born 
children in such a situation no more than a share of the gift provided to their other 
siblings. In hindsight, this “one size fits all” approach to a testator’s intent seems 
equally as inflexible as the previous rule and just as likely to lead to results inconsistent 
with the testator’s intent. Consider, for instance, a situation where one or more 
children seriously impair their relationship with their parents. Should one or both of 
the parents memorialize the situation by reducing or eliminating the children’s 
inheritance, the 1966 amendment would interpret that act of the parent as subsequent 
intent to reduce or eliminate the inheritance of all after-born children.
 The flaws in the 1966 amendment first became apparent twenty-two years later 
in Matter of Ashby.66 In Ashby, the testator, Neal T. Ashby, had two children at the 
time he executed his will.67 According to his will, both adult children were “for their 
own reasons, of little comfort, companionship or assistance to [him] in their 
adulthood.”68 Accordingly, Mr. Ashby gave the two children only a pittance in his 
will: $1000 each.69 After writing this will, Mr. Ashby divorced his first wife, 
64. Id. The underlying principle was the “reasonably presumable intention of the normal parent.” Id. at 2907.
65. See. id. The court in a later case, In re Will of Ashby, noted that the Temporary Commission on Estates 
[1966] observed that under the “prior [version of the] law where a testator intended to benefit his wife to 
the exclusion of his children, the after-born was, nevertheless, entitled to a full intestate share.” In re 
Will of Ashby, 524 N.Y.S.2d 652, 654 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 1988) (citing Temp. State Comm’n on 
the Modernization, Revision, and Simplification of the Law of Estates, Fifth Report 778 
(1966)). The solution to this problem was to limit the after-born child share to that of the other children 
inheriting under the will.
66. See In re Will of Ashby, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
67. Id. at 653.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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remarried, and had a daughter, Caroline.70 At her father’s death, Caroline was in no 
way provided for in her father’s will or any extraneous settlement,71 making her an 
after-born child under the statute before and after the 1966 amendment. However, 
under the amended statute, Caroline was limited to one-third of the $2000 collectively 
awarded to her other siblings, and not a full intestate share.72 While the judge certainly 
felt sympathy for Caroline,73 this sympathy was nevertheless outweighed by the very 
rigid nature of the new statute.74 Despite not siding with Caroline, the judge was so 
sympathetic to her case that he forwarded his decision to the Law Revision 
Commission to encourage remedial legislation.75
 Accordingly, four years later in 1992, the New York legislature passed an 
amendment to EPTL 5-3.2 that specifically overruled the reluctant decision of 
Matter of Ashby. This amendment gave the courts discretion to give an after-born 
child a significantly larger portion of the parent’s estate “[i]f it appears from the will 
that the intention of the testator was to make a limited provision” to the testator’s 
then-living children.76 Such an amendment again reflects the ongoing purpose of the 
statute—to give effect to the “reasonably presumable intention of the normal 
parent”—but provides f lexibility for subtle differences in factual scenarios when 
determining whether the after-born child takes an entire intestate portion of the 
parent’s estate, or whether the child has to share a portion of the estate already left to 
their siblings.77 Similarly, a common law or statutory exception for after-known 
children would benefit the current statute by providing the court increased f lexibility 
to interpret the intent of the testator regarding after-known children.
 Not long after the 1992 amendment, the New York Legislature passed two more 
amendments to EPTL 5-3.2, one in 2006 and another in 2007. The 2006 amendment 
clarified what should happen under the statute in the instance that the testator’s sperm 
or eggs are used to create children after a testator’s death.78 Seeing inheritance by these 
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 654. In 1988, EPTL 5-3.2(a) stated that “[i]f the testator has one or more children living when he 
executes his last will” and “[p]rovision is made therein for one or more of such children,” then “the 
portion of the testator’s estate in which the after-born child may share is limited to the disposition made 
to children under the will.” N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 5-3.2(a)(1) (McKinney 2011).
73. In re Will of Ashby, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 654 (“[I]t may be argued that where the will itself states that a 
bequest to children is limited because of ill feelings towards them, the after-born should receive an 
intestate share.”).
74. See id. (noting that “[t]he courts must give effect to legislation as it is written not as they or others 
believe it should be written”).
75. See id. 
76. 1992 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 611 (A. 10425-A) (McKinney) (codified at Est. Powers & Trusts § 5-3.2).
77. 1966 N.Y. Laws 2907. 
78. 2006 N.Y Sess. Laws, New York Bill Jacket, ch. 249, A.B. 10721 (2006), Chief Administrative Judge 
Jonathan Lippman, Memorandum in Support of A. 10721 (McKinney) (“Recent developments in 
reproductive technology now make it possible for children to be conceived and born many years after the 
death of the biological father and/or mother.” (citing Ronald Chester, Posthumously Conceived Heirs 
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posthumous children as unfair to the children conceived during the testator’s lifetime,79 
the 2006 amendment restricted the term after-born children to mean only the testator’s 
children “born during the testator’s lifetime or in gestation at the time of the testator’s 
death and born thereafter.”80 While the amendment narrows the scope of the statute, 
its purpose is to elaborate on the same, unchanged legislative intent behind the statute.81 
By excluding posthumously conceived children, the statute seeks to remain in harmony 
with the “reasonably presumable intent of the normal parent.”82
 Finally, the next and most recent amendment to the after-born statute occurred in 
2007; it formally recognizes that an illegitimate child is a child of the testator within 
the meaning of the statute.83 This amendment was motivated by the case In re Estate 
of Wilkins.84 In Wilkins, the testator, Delwyn Wilkins, executed his last will and 
testament on January 29, 1965.85 Thereafter, Wilkins and Mamie Minor conceived a 
Under a Revised Uniform Probate Code, 38 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 728, 728–30 (2004))); Kristine S. 
Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father’s Last Will, 46 Ariz. L. Rev. 91, 92–99 (2004); Kayla 
VanCannon, Note, Fathering a Child from the Grave: What Are the Inheritance Rights of Children Born 
Through New Technology After the Death of a Parent?, 52 Drake L. Rev. 331, 338–41 (2004).
79. See 2006 N.Y Sess. Laws, New York Bill Jacket, ch. 249, A.B. 10721 (2006), Sen. John A DeFrancisco, 
Letter to Hon. Richard Platkin, Counsel to the Governor (July 25, 2006) (McKinney) (“This 
legislation would eliminate the possibility that a child born many years after the death of the testator, 
without the testator’s desire and knowledge, will claim a share of the estate, thereby unfairly depriving 
the testator’s children born during his lifetime of their full expected inheritance.”).
80. 2006 N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 249 (A. 10721) (McKinney).
81. See 2006 N.Y Sess. Laws, New York Bill Jacket, ch. 249, A.B. 10721, Letter to Hon. Richard Platkin, 
Counsel to the Governor. (“The sperm, ova or preembryos may have been donated to a fertility clinic, 
without any intent on the part of the donor that a resulting child would share in his or her estate.”)
82. 1966 N.Y. Laws 2907. For an article arguing that posthumous children should be included under the 
statute, see generally Robert Matthew Harper, Dead Hand Problem: Why New York’s Estates, Powers and 
Trusts Law Should Be Amended to Treat Posthumously Conceived Children as Decedents’ Issue and Descendants, 
21 Quinnipiac Prob. L.J. 267 (2008).
83. 2007 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 249 (amending EPTL 5-3.2(b) to read “[f]or purposes of this section, a non-
marital child, born after the execution of a last will shall be considered an after-born child of his or her 
father where paternity is established pursuant to section 4-1.2 of this chapter.”). Furthermore, there was 
overwhelming support for the amendment in the New York Legislature. The bill passed the Assembly 
150 to 0 and the Senate 60 to 1. 2007 N.Y. Sess. Laws, New York Bill Jacket, 2007 S.B. 789, Ch. 423 
(McKinney).
Illegitimate children have only incrementally received rights putting themselves on par with their 
legitimate counterparts under New York’s EPTL. See John M. Czygier, Jr. & Barbara Howe, Estate 
Planning and the Non-Marital Child, 83 N.Y. St. B.J. 34, 35 (2011), for more detail on the EPTL sections 
that were gradually amended to provide illegitimate children with the same intestacy rights as legitimate 
children under the law.
84. In re Estate of Wilkins, 691 N.Y.S.2d 878 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1999). The Introducer’s Memorandum in 
Support of senate bill 789 (2007) notes two cases, In re Estate of Wilkins, and In re Estate of Walsh, N.Y.L.J., 
May 13, 1998, at 31-32 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Cnty.), as cases that demonstrate the inconsistency in not expressly 
accepting illegitimate children in EPTL 5-3.2. However, the memorandum also notes that the Walsh case 
would have been barred despite express acceptance of illegitimate children under the statute. In Walsh, the 
petitioner was already barred because she had conceded that her father knew of her existence before he 
wrote his will, clearly disqualifying her from availing herself of the after-born statute. Id.
85. In re Estate of Wilkins, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
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child while Mamie was still married to Raymond Minor.86 For fear of losing her job 
at the State Department for having a child out-of-wedlock, Mamie Minor wrote on 
the child’s birth certificate that her husband, Raymond Minor, was the father.87 
Although Mamie and Raymond Minor were married at the time of the child’s birth, 
Mamie had left Raymond three years earlier after discovering that Raymond may 
have still been married to his first wife at the time of his marriage to Mamie.88
 For the Surrogate’s Court, the question was whether the child born to Wilkins 
and Minor out-of-wedlock could void Wilkins’s will, thereby allowing the out-of-
wedlock child to inherit as an after-born child.89 Despite two cases on point decided 
to the contrary,90 the court distinguished the Wilkins case because of recent changes 
to EPTL 4-1.2 (Inheritance by non-marital children), which allowed inheritance by 
non-marital children even when the child’s mother and father do not eventually 
marry.91 Even though EPTL 5-3.2 had not been likewise amended, the court 
reasoned that interpreting EPTL 5-3.2 as including illegitimate children was 
sufficiently consistent with the trend in social attitudes demanding abolition of the 
“unchosen birthgiven shackles of illegitimacy and to confer filial equality wherever 
possible.”92 Thus, the court’s decision furthers the purpose of EPTL 5-3.2 by 
adjusting to the intent of the modern testator and recognizing that such testators 
now likely desire that their children born out-of-wedlock should be treated the same 
as children born within a marriage. The question now seems to be whether society 
also wishes to recognize out-of-wedlock children that the testator was unaware of at 
the time they drafted their will as after-born children. Certainly the father would 
have a responsibility toward the child during his lifetime,93 so it would only seem just 
that the father’s estate should also carry this responsibility.
86. Id. at 879–80. Michael Minor was born on June 28, 1969. Id. at 880.
87. Id. The decision does not note when Mamie and Raymond got a divorce, but presumably it was after 
Michael was conceived. Id. at 879.
88. Id.
89. Id. The situation in In re Estate of Wilkins is different from the situation the revision of 1966 intended to 
prevent. The 1966 revision intended to prevent an after-born child from inheriting in cases where all of 
the testator’s other children had been excluded under the will. See N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law 
§ 5-3.2(a)(1) (McKinney 2011) (“If the testator has one or more children living when he executes his last 
will, and: (A) No provision is made therein for any such child, an after-born child is not entitled to share 
in the testator’s estate.”). In the Wilkins case, Delwyn Wilkins had no other children, meaning that 
Michael Minor was not barred from inheriting under the 1966 amendment to the after-born statute 
embodied in EPTL 5-3.2(a)(1)(A). In re Estate of Wilkins, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
90. Id. at 881 (citing In re Crawford, 315 N.Y.S.2d 890 (1970); In re Tomacelli-Filomarino, 73 N.Y.S.2d 297 
(1947)).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 882 (citing Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 314 N.Y.S.2d 188, 190 (1970)).
93. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 413 (McKinney 2011). According to Merril Sobie’s Practice Commentaries, 
section 413 was amended in 1960 to stipulate that “the natural parents of a child born out-of-wedlock 
shall be severally liable for the support of such child.” Id. § 413 cmt. The child support obligation in 
New York continues until the child is twenty-one years old. Id. § 414(1)(a).
652
In re Gilmore
 Overall, the legal history of EPTL 5-3.2 ref lects a pattern of legislative and 
judicial thought that has the purpose of avoiding inadvertent or accidental 
disinheritance of children.94 Such a purpose has, at its heart, the intent of the testator. 
Prior to the early twentieth century, recognizing children whom the testator had 
inadvertently or accidentally disinherited seems to have been relatively straightforward: 
only legitimate children could qualify as children. As society began to recognize 
adopted and then non-marital children as also being children that could be 
accidentally disinherited, inheritance became more complicated.95 This trend 
continues today, and with other factors such as increased divorce rates and increased 
birthrates of non-marital children, cases such as Gilmore—involving multiple 
marriages, marital and non-marital children, and after-known children—are only 
increasingly likely to appear before the courts.96 These cases and their increasing 
complexity do not make EPTL 5-3.2 less useful; they make it more useful, but only 
if the statute and its common law interpretation can continue to adapt to society’s 
needs. To this end, the adoption exception and amendments like those which 
occurred in 1992 are helpful because they give the court more f lexibility to tailor the 
outcome of the statute to the specific situations that arise.
 While the court in Gilmore came to the logical conclusion that Roy Gilmore very 
likely did not intend for the adult Hofler children to inherit any of his wealth, the 
reasoning used by the court, which excluded after-known children, demonstrates a 
problem with EPTL 5-3.2. The statute is not equipped to handle cases in which the 
testator has biological children that he is unaware of at the time he executes his will. 
The problem, however, likely did not receive the attention that it deserved because 
Roy Gilmore clearly did not intend to pass on any inheritance to any of his children 
except Angela Manning. Consider how differently the case could have proceeded if 
the Hoflers had been orphaned minors or if Roy Gilmore had given all of his children 
substantial inheritances. Should such a case come before a court in New York, the 
Second Department has set a clear precedent that will deprive the lower courts of the 
f lexibly to distribute the testator’s assets to after-known children.
94. See In re Estate of Faber, 305 N.Y. 200, 203 (1953) (“[The after-born statute’s] purpose was . . . to guard 
against inadvertent or unintentional disinheritance.” (citing Wormser v. Croce, 120 App. Div. 287, 289 
(1st Dep’t 1907) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
95. See generally supra note 4.
96. While instances of men having children they are unaware of may be historically rare, the number of 
these cases seems likely to increase as the United States has seen a dramatic increase in unintended non-
marital births between 1970 and 2009. See Gladys Martinez et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Health 
Statistics, Fertility of Men and Women Aged 15–44 Years in the United States: National 
Survey of Family Growth, 2006–2010, at 2 (2012), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr051.
pdf. “In 1970, 11% of all live births were to unmarried women compared with 41% of all live births in 
2009.” Id. (citing Brady E. Hamilton et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Births: 
Preliminary Data for 2010 (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr60/nvsr60_02.pdf.) 
“Among births between 1999 and 2002, 77% of those to married women were intended at conception, 
while only 35% of those to never-married women were intended at conception.” Id. (citing Chandra A. 
Martinez et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Fertility, Family Planning, and 
Reproductive Health of U.S. Women: Data from the 2002 National Survey of Family 
Growth (2005), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_025.pdf).

